Around the world, the tax laws are shaped by concerns with competitiveness. This paper provides a general theory of how taxes impact competitiveness. As part of that theory, this paper also introduces the concept of tax-based competitiveness neutrality. A tax system is competitively neutral when taxes do not cause competitors to change their relative valuations of any investments. This paper then uses that theory to evaluate tax policy in two high profile and important areas.
I. Introduction
Around the world, the tax laws are shaped by concerns with competitiveness. Governments often respond favorably to the argument that an industry is at a competitive disadvantage from regulation, unfair foreign practices, or taxes by amending the tax law to reduce the industry's tax burden. As a result, the tax laws contain many provisions that attempt to eliminate what would otherwise be tax-driven advantages and disadvantages in competitiveness. For example, in the United States, the unrelated business income tax (UBIT) was enacted in order to eliminate a perceived advantage that not-for-profit entities enjoy due to their exemption from the income tax. And for decades, the U.S. federal government has sought to offset the perceived advantage enjoyed by competitors from countries that rebate value added taxes on exported goods and services through a series of incentives, which have been consistently struck down by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor.
The usual way that commentators, politicians and policy experts think about the relationship between taxation and competitiveness is by comparing the total tax burden from an activity across competitors. The competitor with the lower tax burden is said to have a taxinduced competitiveness advantage; the one with the higher burden, a disadvantage. That simple way of thinking about how taxes affect competitiveness is sometimes right, but often wrong. As described below, a simple comparison of tax burdens will reflect a tax-driven competitiveness advantage when the competition is between conduits that raise the funds to make an investment, but not when it is between the ultimate investors. However, recognizing whether the competition is between conduits or investors can be more difficult than would appear at first blush. Also, depending upon the question that is being asked, the competition between the conduits or the investors might be more relevant. 3 At a very general level, competitiveness deals with the production of goods and services for sale. A tax will affect competitiveness if it changes production relative to the untaxed equilibrium. What I have in mind is the traditional partial equilibrium analysis from basic economics. I want to put income effects to one side and focus on substitution effects -changes in relative prices. Another way to view this exercise is as evaluating what are often described as tax incentives/disincentives. That is to say, when do taxes encourage some competitors relative to other competitors?
Taxes can affect competition in at least two ways. They can cause a change in the total amount and composition of the goods and services produced. They can also change who produces various goods and services. I am especially interested in the last question because that appears to be the kind of question that motivates important public debates. For example, do taxes encourage foreign producers to produce cars for the U.S. market over U.S. producers? Do taxes place U.S. multinational corporations at a disadvantage relative to foreign corporations? The important competitiveness questions do not all involve cross-border transactions. Do taxes give not-for-profit entities an advantage in competing against for-profit entities? The purpose behind this paper is to provide a framework to begin to answer these and many related questions. 4 An intuitive way of conceptualizing competitiveness is to think in terms of the value a competitor places on an asset, project, or business (a candidate investment). The higher the value, the more competitive is a party in competing for that asset, project or business. This definition is consistent with many of our intuitions. For example, more efficient production technology, lower production costs, more efficient management, greater influence with One objection to equating competitiveness with value is that some competitors might 5 value an opportunity highly, but they are prevented by regulations or other barriers from either making the investment or squeezing much value out of it. However, when looked at from the perspective of how taxes affect competitiveness, these non-tax barriers are simply reductions in value.
Economists call that the derived demand for an asset. 6 4 regulators, or a lower cost of capital all give rise to advantages in competitiveness. In addition, 5 this definition of competitiveness can be applied in many situations.
Competitors often find themselves bidding against one another for existing facilities. For example, a for-profit entity and a not-for-profit entity might both be competing to purchase an existing company. In such a case, taxes affect competitiveness if the tax system changes the price one entity is willing to bid relative to that of another entity. Thus, for example, if taxes reduce the maximum bid price for all competitors by ten percent, there is no effect on competitiveness. On the other hand, if taxes change the competitors' maximum bid prices so that the for-profit entity, which would have been the high bidder without taxes, is outbid by the notfor-profit entity with taxes, then taxes have affected competitiveness.
That same logic applies when the competitors are not looking to purchase an existing asset, project or business, but are instead looking to construct it themselves. In such cases, there are usually one or more scarce resources that the parties are competing to acquire. The competitor that places the highest value on the project will generally place the highest value on these scare resources and therefore acquire them. 6 Furthermore, that same logic also carries over when the parties are competing to acquire knowledge or to be the first entrant in a new market. In general, the party that values the opportunity the most is likely to invest the most, and so has a higher probability of achieving its goals. Its actions might even discourage other potential competitors from trying to enter the market. Once again, taxes affect competitiveness by changing the relative values that parties put on such candidate investments. Thus, it is plausible to speak in terms of how much each competitor values a candidate investment (i.e., the maximum bid price). Taxes then can affect competitiveness by changing the relative values that parties put on a candidate investment.
Finally, the same logic also applies when the parties compete not by bidding for an asset, but by reducing the prices they charge for the goods and services that they can produce with the asset. Lower prices that translate into lower revenues reduce the value of an asset to its owner. Thus, if a reduction in the price of the goods or services to be sold reduces one party's valuation of an asset less than a second party's valuation of that same asset, then the first party has a taxinduced competitiveness advantage relative to the second. Thus, taxes can influence the ability of competitors to compete through lower prices.
The reverse -shifting ownership from a less efficient to a more efficient organization -7 will only happen when there is some non-tax non-neutrality that the tax system offsets and exceeds.
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The above approach to taxes and competitiveness also suggests a simple definition for a tax system that is neutral with respect to competitiveness. A tax system is competitively neutral if taxes do not (cannot) affect the rank order of bid prices among potential bidders for a candidate investment. A competitively non-neutral tax system then is one where taxes can change relative bid prices. In such a case, taxes are likely to affect who makes what investments by changing relative valuations.
Before leaving this Part, I want to touch briefly on the issue of why we should be interested in competitiveness. Of course, politicians, the press and the public are interested, but their focus is usually on jobs, which confounds economists. For the economists, I offer three additional reasons.
The first reason comes from the theory of the firm and the economic literature on industrial organization. Because individuals are not all equally productive and organizations are not all equally efficient, the cash flow that a collection of assets will generate depends on who owns the assets and through what organizational structure. As a result, the tax system, by shifting ownership from a more productive owner to a less productive owner or from a more efficient organization to a less efficient organization, can produce a real welfare cost. In this 7 view, a competitively neutral tax system (tax neutrality or competitiveness neutrality) is positive sum.
The second reason is the possibility of positive externalities. If ownership produces external benefits to a group that is connected with the owner, but which the owner cannot capture, then tax policy can influence who will receive those positive externalities. For example, if residents of the country where a multinational corporation is based receive positive externalities when that corporation owns certain foreign businesses, then the tax authorities in that corporation's home country have a rationale for using tax policy to encourage such ownership. Assuming that the externalities accrue to residents of whatever country owns these businesses (and are of the same size), then the tax authorities of many countries have the same incentive to encourage their own businesses at the expense of competing foreign businesses. In that case, a tax system that is not competitively neutral is (largely) zero sum. Whatever one country gains comes at the expense of another country. Alternatively, if the effect of competition to capture such external benefits results in the dissipation of those benefits (even only in part), then a competitively neutral tax system, by restraining such competition, will be positive sum.
The third reason is the possibility that competitors might be engaged in a race where there is an economic advantage to the first party to reach a particular milestone. Patents, although the most obvious such example, are not the only example. When parties race against one another, taxes, by encouraging or discouraging investment, can affect the results. Because the welfare I use the term conduit to mean an investment vehicle rather than the ultimate investor. Specifically, I am not using the term conduit, as it is often used in the tax literature, as a synonym for an investment entity that is not obligated to pay taxes itself. I refer to an entity that does not have an obligation to pay tax on its own behalf as a pass-through entity.
More generally, investors will trade-off tax and non-tax considerations in selecting 10 conduit entities. 6 effects of races are complicated and uncertain, a competitively neutral tax system can be negative sum, zero sum or positive sum.
III. Two Models of How Taxes Affect Competitiveness
This Part presents the basic theory of how taxes affect competitiveness. I offer two models -(1) the new money or conduit model and (2) the old money or investor model. Both models are valid, but they apply in different circumstances. Recognizing when to apply each model is one of the keys to understanding how taxes affect competitiveness. In this Part, I describe the two models. In Part IV, I discuss when each one applies. In Part V, I extend the basic models to cover substitutes for ownership. And in Part VI, I use the insights developed in Parts III through V to examine two areas where concerns with competitiveness have shaped the tax law -the taxation of not-for-profit entities's unrelated business activities and the taxation of cross-border transactions.
A. The Conduit (or New Money) Model
Consider a simple example. Andrew is looking to invest $1000 in a project that will pay $1100 in one year. Andrew can make the investment through either one of two entities. If he makes the investment through entity A, he will pay tax on his income from the project at 20 percent; if he makes the investment through entity B, he will be taxed at 40 percent. Obviously, This is an application of the all-parties perspective that Scholes et al. advocate. See That is to say, the hurdle rate is the required after-tax return divided by one minus the 14 tax rate.
The hurdle rate for the investment if Andrew holds the investment through entity A is 15 calculated as follows: 7.5 percent = 6 percent / (1 -20 percent).
The hurdle rate for the investment if Andrew holds the investment through entity A is 16 calculated as follows: 10 percent = 6 percent / (1 -40 percent).
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In choosing a conduit that minimizes taxes, an investor should consider all taxes that are ultimately borne by the investor. Thus, an investor is concerned not only with the taxes that she herself pays, but also with the taxes that a corporation pays on her behalf. Under a classical 11 corporate tax system, such as the one employed by the United States, interest payments are deductible by the corporate payor, but dividends and redemptions are not. Thus, an equity investment in a corporation attracts two levels of tax -the corporation and the investor. In contrast, an investment through debt attracts only one level of tax -the investor. In addition, the investor should consider the timing of taxes. Taxes paid at different times need to be compared by reducing them all to their present value (PV).
Returning to the example, the project is worth more to Andrew if he holds it through entity A than if he holds it through entity B. Assume Andrew can earn 6 percent after tax on his money (without incurring any risk). Andrew then will value the investment if he holds it through entity A at $1018.87, and if he holds it through entity B at $1000. That result can also be 12 13 expressed in terms of hurdle rates -the minimum before-tax return an investment must generate in order to have a positive net present value (NPV). The hurdle rate is just the required after-tax return grossed up for taxes. Thus, Andrew's hurdle rate for a one-year investment to be made 14 through entity A is 7.5 percent and through entity B is 10 percent.
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Looked at from the perspective of the entities, we would expect to see entity A attracting new capital and making new investments while entity B fails to attract new capital and contracts. Entity A enjoys a tax-driven competitiveness advantage when competing for investments that require new financing because investments made through entity A are taxed less heavily than those made through entity B. In order to eliminate that advantage, either the tax rate on investments made through entity A must be raised or the tax rate on investments made through There is an invalid argument that yields a result similar to the result reported in the text 17 -a higher tax rate disadvantages a competitor by an amount that is in proportion to the difference in rates -that should not be confused with the argument in the text. That invalid argument is also the basis for much of the legal and policy-based literature on taxes and competitiveness. That argument is the standard static argument from economic textbooks about taxes. In the traditional argument, an ad valorem or fixed dollar value per unit tax is imposed on the supplier. If such taxes differ across suppliers, it will raise the marginal cost curves of some suppliers relative to others. Those suppliers who see their marginal cost curves shifted further up will experience a larger decline in sales and so are competitively disadvantaged by their higher tax burden.
There are several problems with carrying this analogy over to investments in markets with income taxes. First, the standard textbook exposition is about sales taxes, not income taxes. When the tax is on income the differential effect on sales disappears. That is because taxes operate at the margin and in the simple example without investment, the profit at the margin is zero (and hence so is the marginal tax.) Of course, the differential tax rates have a differential impact on profits (which are measured by producer surplus), but that is not the same as having an effect on sales. Second, the standard model does not include a temporal component. When such a component is added the model changes drastically and we are in the situation described in the text. 8 entity B lowered until the tax rates across the two entities are the same. If, for example, the tax rates on investments through both entities are set at 40 percent, Andrew will have $1060 after tax regardless of through which entity he choose to invest. This is all obvious and pretty much the standard way of thinking about the issue.
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More generally, in order for taxes not to affect investors' choices across different conduits, the tax burden on an investment through different conduits must be the same. We measure the tax burden on an investment by the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on the investment. The EMTR is the present value of all future taxes on an investment divided by the 18 present value (PV) of the return on the investment. Thus, when the competition is across 19 conduits, competitiveness neutrality requires that the tax cost (measured by the EMTR) is across conduits competing for funds be equal. That will ensure that no conduit has a tax-induced competitiveness advantage over any other conduit in attracting capital and making investments with that capital.
It is worth mentioning that when the competing entities are pass-through entities, then the There are some tax differences across these entities that could lead to tax-induced 20 advantages and disadvantages in some situations. For the most part, the differences in tax treatment are small, but not always. One example where the differences can be large is when it is possible to make allocations to the parties that are not pro-rata.
For further discussion of debt and debt substitutes, see Part V, infra.
21
Entity A might be on a personal account; entity B might be through a corporation.
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These tax rates are assumed to be flat and fixed; no distinction is made between 23 ordinary income and capital gain. 9 choice of entity will generally be a competitively neutral decision on tax grounds. For example, if we are looking at different partnerships or comparing partnerships, S corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs), then none of the entities will have a tax-induced competitiveness advantage. That is because the tax consequences are passed on to investors and there is no 20 entity level tax. That is obvious.
There is another less obvious situation. Taxable entities, such as corporations, can be pass-through entities with respect to certain kinds of investments. Because interest on debt is tax deductible by the payor, the taxable income on debt-financed corporate investment are not taxed to the corporation. Thus, even in the presence of different tax rates across corporations, a corporation with a low EMTR does not have a tax-induced competitiveness advantage over one with a high EMTR on debt-financed investments. Instead, the corporations are competitively neutral with respect to their debt-financed investments, although they are not competitively neutral with respect to investments that use equity financing in whole or part. Returning to the example, assume that Andrew will be taxed at 20 percent if he makes the investment. Consider a second potential investor, Betty, who is also looking at the same 22 investment. Betty is taxed at 40 percent. Assume further that there is only one unit of the 23 investment available and that the unit cannot be divided. If Andrew acquires the investment for $1000, he will end up with $1080 after paying taxes; if Betty acquires the investment for $1000, she will end up with $1060 after paying taxes.
It might be thought that Betty is at a tax-induced competitiveness disadvantage relative to Andrew because she is taxed at a higher rate (40 percent as opposed to 20 percent). After all, Andrew ends up with $1080, whereas Betty ends up with only $1060 from that same investment. Furthermore, it is often implicitly assumed, and sometimes explicitly stated, that Andrew will outbid Betty because he ends up with more than she does after paying taxes. That, however, does not follow.
The investments should be appropriately adjusted for risk. Throughout, I assume that 24 all investments are riskless to simplify exposition.
In this Section, I assume that Andrew and Betty are each investing their own money.
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In the previous Section, I considered the possibility of financing the investment with outside sources. In that case, the return must be sufficient to cover the cost of financing the investment.
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To begin, Betty is not willing to pay up to $1060 and Andrew up to $1080 to make the investment. Each party's after-tax return if he or she were to buy the asset for $1000 is not that party's maximum bid price for the investment. As Andrew and Betty each increase their bid price above $1000, each one increases his or her basis in the investment, and so decreases his or her taxable income from the investment. As incomes decrease, so do tax liabilities. If Andrew and Betty are both willing to accept an after-tax return of zero, then each would be willing to pay the full $1100 for the candidate investment. In that case, neither one pays any tax and both bid the same amount -$1100. Andrew's lower tax rate then would not provide him with a competitiveness advantage (or disadvantage) relative to Betty.
Of course, unless the investment pays off immediately, it is unlikely that either Andrew or Betty would be willing to pay the full $1100. There are other investments that Andrew and Betty can make with their funds. Thus, Andrew and Betty should only raise their bid for the candidate investment as long as their after-tax rate of return on the candidate investment is greater than what they could earn on their other alternative investments.
If the candidate investment takes 24 time to payoff, then Andrew and Betty will each want to receive a return that compensates for what they could otherwise earn on their money.
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Let us assume that Andrew and Betty each have in excess of $1000 available in their bank accounts earning 10 percent annually. Assume further that if either Andrew or Betty purchases the investment, he or she must withdraw that money from the bank to pay for the investment.
Consider Andrew first. In one year, $1000 in his bank account will grow into $1100. Assuming that interest is taxed each year as it is earned, then Andrew will have to pay $20 in tax and so he will be left after paying taxes with $1080 at the end of the year. Now look at Betty. In one year, $1000 in her bank account will also grow into $1100. Assuming that Betty is subject to the same tax rules as Andrew, she will also report $100 income. However, because Betty is taxed at 40 percent, not 20 percent, she will owe $40 tax, and so she will be left after paying taxes with only $1060 at the end of the year.
What then are the maximum amounts that Andrew and Betty are each willing to pay for the candidate investment? Andrew is willing to pay up to (but no more than) $1000 for the investment. After taxes, the investment pays Andrew $1080, which is what $1000 in the bank leaves him in one year after taxes. Betty, however, is also willing to pay up to (but no more than) $1000 for the investment. That is because, after taxes, the investment pays her $1060, which is the same amount that $1000 in the bank leaves her. How is it that the investment has the same See discussion of clientele effects in this Section, infra.
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See discussion of UBIT, infra. The answer comes from recognizing that the tax operates at two levels. The first and most obvious effect of the tax is that it reduces the return from the candidate investment. For Andrew, it reduces the return by $20 from $100 to $80; for Betty, it reduces the return by $40 from $100 to $60. This first effect operates in Andrew's favor and is the most salient effect of the tax.
There is, however, also a second effect. The tax also reduces the return on the alternative investments that the parties otherwise make. For Andrew, his 20 percent tax reduces the return he receives if he keeps his money in the bank by $20 from $100 to $80. For Betty, her 40 percent tax rate reduces her return on her alternative investment by $40 from $100 to $60. This second effect operates in Betty's favor. Because Betty ends up with less than Andrew if she keeps her money in the bank, she values the investment more than otherwise.
The two effects described above operate in opposite directions. A higher tax rate means a smaller return from the investment under consideration; it also means that the candidate investment has to achieve a lower after-tax hurdle rate to be accepted. In the simple example discussed above, these two effects precisely offset each other so that the investment is worth exactly $1000 to both Andrew and Betty. 26 Although the first effect is obvious, the second effect is easily overlooked. The obscurity of the second effect frequently leads policymakers, commentators and others to conclude that a party is at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage because it would pay tax at a higher rate on the cash flow generated by an investment than would another potential investor. As the example of 27 Andrew and Betty illustrates, Betty's higher tax rate does not necessarily place her at a taxinduced competitive disadvantage. Thus, the effect of different EMTRs on old funds is not the same as that on new funds. When investors are investing their own funds, different EMTRs across investors have no effect on competitiveness.
Several results follow from the observation that Andrew and Betty, in spite of facing different tax rates, are each willing to pay up to $1000 (but no more) to purchase the candidate investment. First, if one or the other party is a more efficient manager of the investment, then he or she will outbid the other. For example, if either Andrew or Betty (but not both) squeezes an additional $1.10 out of the investment, then that party will value the investment at $1001, and so could outbid the other party by $1. Thus, when each party is investing its own money only, there is no need to eliminate differences in tax rates in order to level the playing field. In other words, a difference in tax rates among the ultimate investors does not translate into a difference in One way to think of the difference between the two models is that the taxing 28 authorities have an additional degree of freedom in designing a competitively neutral tax system when the competition is between investors that they do not have when the competition is between conduits. When the competition is between investors, they can assign each investor a different tax burden (EMTR) without compromising competitiveness neutrality. However, when the competition is between conduits they do not have this freedom and so must assign the same tax burden (EMTR) to each conduit if they want to preserve competitiveness neutrality.
This result assumes that the each party's investment capital is given and fixed. If taxes 29 affect the decision whether to save and invest, then there can be consequences from facing differential tax rates. In other words, although there can be consequences on the saving side from differential tax rates, there are no direct consequences on the investment side.
For example, if Andrew and Betty are both considering reducing their sales price to a 30 level that would reduce their payoff from the investment to $1089, then both would value the investment at $990. In other words, the present value cost of reducing price in this way is $10 for both Andrew and Betty.
To be clear, in the old money model, competitiveness neutrality requires that for each 31 investor the EMTR on the candidate investment equal the EMTR on the benchmark investment. Competitiveness neutrality does not require that the candidate (or benchmark) investment have the same EMTR across investors. 12 competitiveness among them. 28 Second, at least in the simple example described above, there is no effect on the ownership of assets from applying different tax rates to different investors. The allocation of assets across owners depends on their relative efficiencies in managing different properties and the amount of money that they each have to invest. That allocation does not depend on what tax rate each party faces.
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Third, also in the simple example, taxes do not affect the relative ability of competitors to reduce their prices. Competitors with the same cost structure, but subject to different tax rates, will see the same relative decrease in value when they reduce their prices by the same amount.
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There is an important and implicit assumption that led to the conclusion that the value that an investor places on an investment is independent of her tax rate. That assumption is that the candidate and benchmark investments are both taxed in the same way -specifically, that the EMTRs on the benchmark and candidate investments are the same for all competitiors. That is 31 not always the case. There is a wide range of investments and many receive special tax treatments. These special treatments can impact competitiveness. The rest of this section extends the investor (or old money) model to situations where the candidate investment has a different EMTR than the benchmark. This extension enriches and complicates the analysis.
That is calculated as follows: $1018.52 = $1100 / 1.08.
32
That is calculated as follows: $1037.74 = $1100 / 1.06. If the asset is available at a cost of $1000 and the competition takes the form of 35 reducing price (and hence revenue), then Betty would be wiling to accept as little as $1060, whereas Andrew will be willing to accept no less than $1080.
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In the example above, both Andrew and Betty value the one-period investment at $1000 even though they are taxed at different rates -Andrew at 20 percent and Betty at 40 percent. In that example, the candidate investment and the benchmark asset both have the same EMTR. That is to say, the income on both investments was taxed at 20 percent when owned by Andrew and at 40 percent when owned by Betty. As a result, neither party has a tax-induced competitiveness advantage or disadvantage in bidding for the candidate investment. Assume, however, that the candidate investment is taxed under different rules than is the benchmark (alternative) asset and so has a different EMTR.
Start with a very simple example. Assume that the income from the candidate one-period investment is untaxed. Thus, if either Andrew or Betty undertakes the investment, he or she will end up with $1100 after paying tax. That is substantially more than either will end up with from investing $1000 in the bank and paying taxes. Thus, Andrew and Betty will both be willing to spend more than $1000 to acquire the project. In order for Andrew to have $1100 at the end of the year after paying taxes, Andrew must deposit $1018.52 in the bank. Thus, that amount -32 $1018.52 -is the maximum Andrew will pay for the project. If Andrew pays less than $1018.52, he is better off with the project; if he pays more, he is better off with his money in the bank.
Consider Betty now. The most Betty will spend for the project is $1037.74. That is because if Betty deposits $1037.74 in the bank, it will grow in one year after paying taxes into $1100. Therefore, if there is only one project available and it is being auctioned between 33 Andrew and Betty, we would expect Betty to buy the project for at least $1018.52, but for no more than $1037.74. Thus, when the project is untaxed, Betty has a tax-based competitiveness 34 advantage over Andrew.
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It is also possible that an investor might have a tax-based competitiveness advantage over another investor even though the first investor would pay more tax than the latter on an investment. To see this assume that the acquirer of the candidate project will be taxed on only half the income (which is equivalent to reducing the tax rate on the income from the project to half of the statutory tax rate). As in the previous example, assume that alternative investments pay 10 percent a year before tax and are fully taxable. Under these circumstances, Andrew is
The maximum amount that a taxpayer in the t tax bracket will pay for an investment 36 that yields $1100 in one year, with the fraction a of economic income included in taxable income, and when alternative investments yield r before tax is given by the following formula: summarize, the high-bracket taxpayer has a tax-induced competitiveness advantage when the project is taxed more heavily (has a higher EMTR) than the benchmark asset.
In the circumstances described above, tax considerations provide Betty with a tax-induced competitiveness advantage over Andrew in bidding for the candidate investment because the candidate investment is taxed less heavily (lower EMTR) than the benchmark asset. The candidate investment is worth more to Betty than to Andrew not because Betty can get more before-tax cash flow out of the investment. By hypothesis, Andrew and Betty both receive the same before-tax cash flow -$1100. It is worth more to Betty because ownership of the asset is a tax-advantaged investment. The value of receiving the investment's untaxed or undertaxed income is greater to Betty than to Andrew because Betty pays more tax on the baseline alternative investment (40%) than does Andrew (20%). However, Betty will not always outbid Andrew for investments that are taxed differently than the benchmark asset.
Once again, the result can be expressed using prices assuming the asset cost $1000. 
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Assume that the entire payoff from the project, both income and return of investment, is taxed at the taxpayer's statutory tax rate. In that case, the investment will be worth much less than $1000 to both Andrew and Betty because whoever acquires the investment pays taxes on $1100. Thus, if Andrew bought the investment, he would end up with only $880 after paying taxes. In order to have $880 after taxes, Andrew must deposit $814.81 in the bank at the start of the year. Thus, $814.81 is the most he would pay for the project. If Betty owned the project, she would only receive $660 after taxes and therefore the most she would pay is $622.64. Thus, Andrew will outbid Betty for the project, paying at least $622.64, but no more than $814.81. Hence, Andrew has a tax-induced competitiveness advantage over Betty. 41 The above results are well known in the tax literature. They are examples of clientele effects. If all assets are taxed in the same way, there are no clientele effects. If, however, some assets are taxed less heavily than the benchmark, those assets will be bid up by competition. Such increases in price and decreases in rates of return are called implicit taxes. High-bracket taxpayers gravitate towards assets with implicit taxes because they trade-off more explicit tax than low-bracket taxpayers for the same increase in implicit tax. Conversely, those assets that are taxed more heavily than the benchmark asset are bid down by competition. Bidding down the price of the asset causes the rate of return to increase. Low-bracket taxpayers will gravitate towards implicitly subsidized assets (assets with negative implicit taxes) because they incur less explicit tax for the same increase in implicit subsidy. Although the tax literature contains many references to clientele effects, the connection between clientele effects and competitiveness has largely been ignored in the academic literature. As a result, that same connection is often overlooked by policymakers and commentators.
Furthermore, it is clear from the tax literature how to provide investment incentives and disincentives through the tax system without affecting competitiveness. Differentially taxed assets produce clientele effects because the dollar value of the differential tax treatment differs across taxpayers. The dollar value to a given taxpayer of undertaxing (or overtaxing) an asset by a given amount is greater the higher is that taxpayer's tax rate. Thus, to eliminate such taxinduced competitiveness effects while maintaining tax incentives requires that the dollar value of tax incentives be equal across investors. The way most incentives work -a constant reduction in income across investors -has a larger dollar value to taxpayers taxed at a higher rate. As others have noted, the use of refundable tax credits eliminates the differential effect while maintaining investment incentives. For example, the untaxed one-period investment is worth $1037.74 to 42 Betty. An investment incentive in the form of a tax credit at purchase of $37.74 and regular This principle also applies to conduits through the cost of financing. It is implied by See IRC Section 613 (authorizing percentage depletion for specified commodities). 46 See, e.g., IRC Section 1014(a) (step up in basis at death).
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I say likely because it is theoretically possible to design a non-uniform system of tax 48 rules that has the effect of converting all tax incentives and disincentives into equal-value credits.
16 income tax treatment of the asset would raise everyone's bid price by $37.74, thereby eliminating any tax-induced competitiveness advantage.
It therefore follows that in order to maintain competitiveness neutrality across competitors who are taxed at different rates while simultaneously providing tax incentives (or disincentives) for some investments, these incentives (and disincentives) should have the same dollar value to all investors. That leads to the requirement for competitiveness neutrality across investors. In order for a tax system to be competitively neutral across investors with different tax rates who invest their own money, tax incentives (and disincentives) must have the same dollar value to all investors. That condition ensures competitiveness neutrality across investors by preventing clientele effects.
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At least two conclusions follow from the requirement that the dollar value of tax incentives/disincentives be equal across competitors. First, proportional decreases/increases in the discounted value of income, such as those that occur from noneconomic depreciation, 44 amortization or depletion, and exclusions from income violate competitiveness neutrality. 45 46 47
In contrast, refundable tax credits are likely to satisfy competitiveness neutrality. Second discriminatory tax rules are likely to violate competitiveness neutrality. Thus, 48 nondiscrimination is an important element of competitiveness neutrality.
C. Summary
This Part has described two models of how taxes can influence who makes what investments -the new money or conduit model and the old money or investor model. When the investment is to be financed by outside sources, the conduit entity through which the tax burden (as measured by the EMTR) is the lowest will have a competitiveness advantage. Thus, when the competition is among conduits, competitiveness neutrality requires that the tax cost of funds to all conduits is equal. In contrast, when the competition occurs between investors, the relative tax burdens (EMTRs) on these investors do not affect competitiveness when the candidate investment is taxed the same (has the same EMTR) as the benchmark investment (for all investors). If, however, the candidate investment does not have the same EMTR as the benchmark asset, then high-bracket investors will have a competitiveness advantage in acquiring assets taxed less heavily than the benchmark asset and low-bracket investors will have a competitiveness advantage in acquiring assets taxed more heavily than the benchmark asset. Thus, when the competition is among investors, competitiveness neutrality requires that the dollar value of investment incentives and disincentives be equal across investors.
IV. When One or the Other Model Applies
The previous Part has described two models of competitiveness -the conduit (or new money) model and the investor (or old money) model. This Part describes how those models should be applied by focusing on when each model should be used. However, before delving into the details, it is worth emphasizing that both models can be reduced to the same numberthe maximum bid price for a given investment. Thus, it is possible to talk about how taxes affect competitiveness between competitors within each model as well as across the two models.
A. When the Conduit (or New Money) Model Applies
The crucial difference between the two models is the source of funding for the candidate investment. If the funding is coming from outside sources, so that the competitors must compete against each other for funds and for the investment, then the conduit or new money model is appropriate. This model views the issue as what is the most tax efficient (lowest tax cost) method for the outside investor to make the investment. In that case, the analysis of how taxes affect competitiveness simplifies into a simple comparison of relative tax burdens.
Expressed in terms of the language of corporate finance, each entity has a cost of capital, which is a function of taxes. The cost of capital establishes the hurdle rate for the candidate investment through each entity. If, by virtue of a difference in taxes, one entity has a lower cost of capital for the same investment than another entity, then the former has a tax-induced advantage in competitiveness over the latter.
Of course, the most tax efficient method of making an investment is not necessarily the way the investment will be made. Non-tax considerations might outweigh tax considerations. For example, partnerships, limited liability companies, and other pass-through entities are A pass-through entity does not pay tax. Instead, the tax attributes pass through to the 49 investors. As a consequence, there is one level of tax only -the investor level.
Equity investments in the corporation generate two levels of tax. The corporation pays 50 tax on its income after allowing a tax deduction for interest, but not for dividends and redemptions. Thus, with equity investments in corporations there are two levels of tax -both corporate and individual taxes.
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probably the most tax efficient methods of producing automobiles, but we do not see any such 49 companies. That is because the non-tax benefits of corporate status, which include liquidity, marketability, and legal certainty, more than compensate for the tax disadvantages. However, corporations are still at a tax disadvantage when it comes to competing for investments that require outside equity financing. And it is identifying tax-based competitiveness advantages 50 and disadvantages that is the focus of this paper.
B. When the Investor (or Old Money) Model Applies
In contrast, if the funding is coming from the investor directly, then the investor or the old money model is the right model to use. This model views the issue as what the investor should do with her funds. In that case, each investor calculates her maximum bid price by discounting the after-tax cash flows on the candidate investment by the after-tax return on the alternative (benchmark) investment. If each investor is taxed the same on the candidate and alternative investment, then each investor's maximum bid depends only on how much she can earn before tax on the candidate investment. In that case, different tax rates across investors have no impact on competitiveness. Alternatively, if the candidate and benchmark asset are taxed differently, then high-bracket taxpayers will have a competitiveness advantage when competing for lowtaxed or untaxed assets and low-bracket taxpayers will have an advantage when competing for high-taxed assets.
It might be thought that competition between entities should always be assessed using the conduit model. That, however, is incorrect as can be illustrated with corporations. Corporations rarely issue new equity, but they frequently reinvest their retained earnings. Thus, when the competition is between corporations over a project that will be financed through retained earnings, and the earnings would not be returned to the shareholders if the corporation did not make the investment, then the investor model would be appropriate to use.
The factors that determine which model is appropriate in any particular circumstance are many. The list includes the size of the project, the cash on hand, dividend and redemption policy, the tax treatments of dividends and redemptions, and agency costs (shareholder control of management). Ultimately, which model to use will often depend upon how a firm treats its retained capital. If managers see retained earnings as belonging to the firm and to be used as they see fit, and if they are determined not to distribute the money to shareholders through dividends In finance, this issue appears in the literature whether there is a lock0in effect for 51 dividends.
In effect, the two models converge to the new money model when the managers of the 52 firm can and will return excess cash to their shareholders if they have no investments available with an expected return in excess of the cost of capital.
The conduit (or new money) model and the investor (or old money model) can also be 53 understood in relation to traditional economic models from other areas. For example, the new money model is an application of the standard discounted cash flow (DCF) model from finance. Viewed as an application of DCF models, the old money model assumes new capital cannot be raised. The two models can also be viewed as applications of David Ricardo's model of comparative advantage. In the standard Ricardian model, production and trade is determined by comparative not absolute advantage since one of the factors of production (typically, labor) is assumed to be fixed. The old money model is an application of the standard Ricardian model of comparative advantage (see discussion of clientele effects) because capital, which is the only factor of production, is assumed to be fixed. In the new money model, absolute advantage determined production because capital is mobile. Both analogies make clear that the old money model approaches the new money model as capital becomes more mobile.
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or redemptions, then the first model will apply when there is no need for outside financing. On the other hand, if the managers view retained earnings as belonging to their shareholders, and if there is no toll charge on dividends, then the conduit model will be appropriate (even if there is 51 no need for outside financing).
52
The above analysis suggests that the appropriate model depends less on the nature of the investors than on the circumstances. Competition between corporations can be assessed using either model depending upon the circumstances. Consider, for example, a corporation that can raise new capital at 12 percent and will return capital to investors rather than invest it itself if it cannot earn more than 8 percent. For such a corporation, if its capital on hand is insufficient to fund all of the projects above 12 percent, then it will raise new funds. Such a corporation should use the conduit (or new money) model in making investment decision. Alternatively, if the corporation's capital is sufficient to fund all projects above 8 percent, then it will not raise new funds. If it does not return any capital, then it should use the investor (or old money model) in making investment decisions with an interest rate of 12 percent. Finally, if the corporation is returning money to shareholders, it should use the conduit (or new money) model with an interest rate of 8 percent. In the extreme, when the cash is not locked into the firm (either through 53 agency costs or taxes) so that the firm will return capital to investors if it cannot earn more than the cost of raising new capital, the two models converge to the cost of raising outside capitalthe conduit model.
C. When Both Models Apply
Agency costs are one reason to expect that new funds, especially new equity, are more 54 expensive than retained earnings. 55 The amount that outside funding will allow Andrew to bid is calculated as follows: 56 $10,667 = $640 / 6 percent.
The amount that Andrew's own funding will allow him to bid is calculated as follows: 
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There are circumstances where models will be applicable. For example, many corporations with ready access to capital markets also have substantial retained earnings in the form of cash. If external funds are more expensive than retained cash, the firm should use the 54 investor (or old money) model for projects financed out of cash on hand and the conduit (or new money) model for projects financed with external capital. However, because money is 55 fungible, the question what model to use cannot be answered simply by tracing funds. Instead, the relevant inquiry is how projects are being funded at the margin. Accordingly, projects should be ordered by internal rate of return (IRR) and if the cash on hand is not sufficient to undertake all projects with an IRR above the hurdle rate for old capital, then the remaining projects with an IRR above the hurdle rate for new capital should be undertaken. In that case, the conduit (or new money) model applies to all projects, even those funded with internal funds. Alternatively, if the cash on hand is sufficient to fund all such projects, then only those projects should be funded. In that case, the investor (or old money) model applies.
Both models will apply when an investor is considering an investment that it will finance using both retained earnings and external financing. In that case, the conduit (or new money) model should be used for external financing and the investor (or old money) model for retained earnings. An example might be helpful. Andrew and Betty are both bidding on a parcel of real estate. The investment will return $100 in perpetuity after expenses and Andrew and Betty are each looking to finance the investment by devoting 80 percent of the investment's annual cash flow to paying a return to the outside investors and by keeping the other 20 percent for themselves, which portion each will finance out of cash on hand. Assume that the cost of external financing rises sharply once more than 80 percent comes from external sources. Assume further that outside investors are looking for an after-tax return of 6 percent. If Andrew's investors are taxed at 20 percent, they will be willing to provide Andrew with financing at a before-tax return (cost of capital) of 7.5 percent. Because Andrew is willing to devote 80 percent of the cash flow to paying his outside investors, their commitment will allow him to bid up to $10,667. On the $200 return Andrew will earn each year, Andrew will pay tax of $40, and have 56 $160 left. Assuming a 10 percent before-tax return on the benchmark asset and a 20 percent tax rate, that cash stream is worth $2000 to Andrew. Thus, he can bid up to $12,667.
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Consider Betty. Assume her investors are also looking for an after-tax return of 6
The amount that Betty's own funding will allow her to bid is calculated as follows: That assumes that the investment is taxed consistently with an income tax. If the 59 investment is undertaxed, the high bracket investor -Betty in the example -will have an advantage; if it is overtaxed, the low-bracket investor -Andrew in the example -will have an advantage. Thus, if the revenue from the investment is excluded from income, but the interest expense can be deducted against other income, thereby generating a more valuable deduction for Betty than for Andrew, then Betty will outbid Andrew. This is discussed in Section III.B., supra.
The amount that outside funding will allow Betty to bid is calculated as follows: 60 $8000 = $480 / 6 percent. 21 percent. Assuming her investors would also be taxed at 20 percent, they would require a beforetax return of 7.5 percent, and so their commitment would also allow her to bid up to $10,667. Betty is taxed at 40 percent and requires an after-tax return of 6 percent. Thus, on the remaining $200 cash flow, she would pay $80 tax and be left with $120. Discounted at 6 percent, this cash flow is worth $2000 to Betty, which takes her maximum bid to $12,667, the same as Andrew's. 58 Thus, for investments that are funded through a mix of internal and external financing, taxation does not affect bid prices so long as the external capital is taxed at the same rate regardless of the bidder, even if the bidders are not taxed at the same rate. And so long as any tax 59 incentives/disincentives on the retained pieces have the same value to all taxpayers.
It, therefore, follows that if external capital is not taxed at the same rate, the conduit entity through which the external capital is taxed at a lower rate will enjoy a competitive advantage in bidding for investments. For example, if Betty's investors were taxed at the same 40 percent tax rate as she is when they finance her investment, they would then require a before-tax rate of return of 10 percent. They would then be wiling to advance only $8000 and so Betty's 60 maximum bid would be $10,000. That is $2667 below Andrew's maximum bid, and so Andrew would be able to outbid Betty for the investment. Conversely, tax incentives on the retained pieces would tend to increase Betty's bid relative to Andrew's.
V. Ownership, Taxes, and Competitiveness
The discussion, so far, has tacitly equated ownership with use. Whoever bids the most to purchase an asset was assumed to have a tax-induced competitiveness advantage in using that asset. However, using an asset in business is not the same as owning that asset. In most cases, competitiveness concerns focus on who uses, controls and is exposed to the risk and rewards from an asset, and not simply on who holds title to that asset. For example, if we wanted to understand how taxes affect competition between state-run and private air carriers it would be incorrect to conclude not at all solely and simply because most airlines lease their aircraft and so Many of these techniques involve partnerships because partnership tax provides 61 partners with much flexibility in making allocations among the partners. In effect, and within limits, tax ownership can therefore be separated from economic ownership.
The income from using the asset if the asset is not used by the owner is subject to tax.
62
The value to Andrew (who is taxed at 20 percent and so earns 8 percent [= 10 63 percent (1 -20 percent)] after-tax on his marginal investments) of a $100 perpetuity that is exempt from tax is calculated as follows: $1250 = $100 / .08. The value of the same $100 untaxed perpetuity to Betty, who is taxed at 40 percent and so earns 6 percent [= 10 percent (1 -40 percent)] after-tax on her marginal investments, is calculated as follows: $1666.67 = $100 / .06. If the competition takes the form of reducing price and hence revenue from the asset, Andrew would need to earn at least $80 [=$1000 x .08], whereas Betty would need to only earn $60 [=$1000 x .06].
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do not hold title. Looked at from the perspective of modern finance, ownership is just one method of financing an asset. There are other, alternative financing techniques. This Part, thus, extends the basic analysis to allow for other methods of using an asset in business besides holding title. In general, such options, when they are legally and economically feasible, tend to promote neutrality. They accomplish this by tending to equalize both the tax cost of new investment funds across conduits and the dollar value of tax incentives across investors.
A capital lease is one obvious method of separating legal ownership (title) from the use of an asset. There are also other techniques. Other examples include securitization and other forms of asset-based financing, research and development partnerships, and movie development partnerships. In the extreme, legal ownership can be completely severed from economic 61 ownership. For example, an owner-lessor by leasing property to a lessee for the property's entire useful life transfers the use of the property and the economic risk associated with owning that property to the lessee. In such cases, the lease is effectively a form of 100 percent financing.
In addition, and crucially for my perspective, such techniques can be used to separate the tax benefits from owning an asset from the use of an asset. For example, a capital lease is a very effective way for a low-tax competitor -whether an investor or a conduit -to enjoy the tax benefits from a tax-favored asset. Because the tax shield generated by economically accelerated depreciation, and other tax incentives, is likely to have little value to such taxpayers, they can avoid what otherwise would be a tax-induced competitiveness disadvantage by shifting the tax benefits to another party that cannot use the asset in its business, but nonetheless highly values the tax benefits generated by the asset.
Assume, for example, a candidate perpetual investment pays $100 annually and that the income from owning the asset is untaxed. Such a perpetual investment is worth $1250 to Andrew and Betty would be willing to earn as little as $50 a year to cover the lease payment on a $1000 asset.
In effect, Andrew and Betty are receiving financing at an annual after-tax cost of 5 66 percent. That is below their after-tax cost of 8 percent and 6 percent for debt. It is the after-tax cost of a taxpayer in the 50 percent bracket. 23 such a taxpayer). If it were possible to enter into a lease for the entire investment both Andrew 64 and Betty would value the asset more highly by leasing the property from an investor in the 50 percent tax bracket than by owning it directly. The lease arrangement would allow Andrew and Betty each to bid up to $2000 for the asset. In effect, Andrew and Betty are each willing to pay 65 up to $100 annually in lease payments. For a taxpayer in the 50 percent tax bracket, she earns 5 percent after tax on the benchmark asset. Thus, such a taxpayer needs to earn an after-tax return of 5 percent from owning and leasing the investment. If she purchases the investment for $2000 and leases it for $100 a year, then she is generating a 5 percent untaxed return. Moreover, both Andrew and Betty would be willing to bid this amount in spite of their different tax rates because the tax benefit is worth more to third party lessors than to either Andrew or Betty. Andrew and Betty, thus, benefit indirectly by transferring the tax benefit to a party that values the benefit more highly than either one of them does and receiving the benefit indirectly through a reduced cost of financing.
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If the entire tax benefit from an undertaxed investment can be transferred, then neither Andrew nor Betty has a tax-derived competitiveness advantage from the undertaxation of that asset and their differential tax rates. That situation is a special case where in spite of the presence of differentially taxed assets clientele effects do not translate into tax-induced competitiveness advantages. Because the tax benefits can, in effect, be transferred to the investors who value the asset's tax benefits most, but cannot use the asset to generate as much revenue, no one has a taxinduced competitiveness advantage. Note that the tax benefit from shifting the tax incentives to a high-bracket investor arises regardless of whether the transaction is a financing transaction. That is to say, the benefit can arise under both the conduit and investor models.
In these circumstances, the tax authorities have more flexibility in designing competitively neutral tax rules. When all of the assets can be leased, then the party who is running the business is not taxed on any portion of the return to capital. All of that return is taxed to outside financiers. Instead, the party running the business is taxed only on the return to its entrepreneurship. As long as that return is taxed the same across the different projects available to an entrepreneur, how heavily that party is taxed relative to other parties will not Of course, in these circumstances, the tax rates applied to these parties are not very 67 important. In the extreme, they apply to no activity and so are irrelevant. If, however, only some of the tax benefit can be transferred to third parties, either because the tax law will not respect a transaction that transfers all of the incidents of ownership to a party that does not hold title or because agency costs or other problems make it costly (perhaps prohibitively so) to make the transfer, them competitiveness neutrality will not be achieved. In that case, we would still expect to see clientele effects. Thus, more heavily taxed parties are likely to still have a tax-driven advantage when competing for undertaxed investments, and conversely. However, that advantage is smaller the larger the portion of an investment's total cost that can be transferred. Nonetheless, in those circumstances, competitiveness neutrality requires either equal tax burdens across investors or the use of refundable credits only.
Thus, for example, assume that the investment is untaxed and that it was possible to lease 80 percent of the assets, but that 20 percent of the assets have to be self-financed. In that case, Andrew and Betty could each devote $80 of the annual cash flow to making lease payments. When then is ownership equated with competitiveness? When it is not feasible to separate ownership and use. That might occur for several reasons. The separation of ownership and use has the potential to create sizeable agency costs that cannot be cheaply reduced through contracting. Alternatively, if tax considerations give one party an advantage in purchasing an asset and those advantages disappear if the property is not used by the owner, then a lease is costly. An example would be owner occupied housing because the benefit of nontaxation of the imputed rent cannot be transferred to a renter. In some cases, the tax laws limit the effectiveness with which ownership and use can be separated. For example, the IRS will not respect all See Rev. Proc. 2001-28 setting forth guidelines that the IRS will use in granting 71 advance letter rulings respecting certain purported leveraged lease transactions.
In a series of papers, I intend to examine competitiveness in a range of markets using 72 the concept of competitiveness neutrality. For now, I want to undertake a tentative and preliminary analysis of the competitiveness issues in only two areas.
Because NYU is a not-for-profit entity listed under Section 501(c)(3) it is exempt from 73 the federal income tax on the money that it earns.
Although Mueller was the best know of NYU's commercial holdings, it was not their Service will treat the transaction as a sale. The purported lessee will then be taxed as the owner and the purported lessor as a lender. Because those tax treatments are usually undesirable, one effect of these rules is to increase the cost of leasing by increasing the agency costs in lease transactions.
VI. Applications
This Part discusses two important areas where concerns with competitiveness have shaped the tax law -tax-exempt organizations and foreign direct investment/cross-border transactions. In both areas, previous commentators have recognized the existence of competitiveness issues. Indeed, the literature is filled with such discussions. However, previous commentators have generally failed to recognize the relevance of both the new and old money models and the role played by each one. Not surprisingly, then, previous commentators have reached different conclusions than a systematic analysis of the rules in these areas through the lens of competitiveness neutrality yields.
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A. Tax-Exempt Organizations When a thankful alumnus bequeathed the C.F. Mueller Co., then the nation's largest manufacturer of noodles and macaroni, to New York University (NYU), for the benefit of its law school, competitors cried foul. Because NYU was not subject to the federal income tax, many otherwise tax-exempt charitable institutions, including private universities, on the incomes they earn on activities that are unrelated to their charitable functions. The UBIT is imposed at 76 the same tax rates that apply to corporations.
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The rationale for the UBIT was and is that without such a provision charities would enjoy an unfair tax-derived competitiveness advantage over their taxable competitors. The argument, which is usually stated as obvious and self-evident, is simply that untaxed competitors will displace tax-paying competitors. Thus, Representative John Dingell, in support of the UBIT bill, warned his colleagues that unless appropriate action is taken "the macaroni monopoly will be in the hands of the university . . . and eventually all the noodles produced in this country will be produced by corporations held or created by universities." Similarly, both the House and 78 Senate Reports accompanying the final bill underscored the problem of unfair competition:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of [Section 501(c)(3)] organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits remaining after taxes.
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And to this day, the Treasury Regulations continue to sound the same theme:
[T]he primary objective of [the UBIT] was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the non-exempt business endeavors with which they compete. Although law-and-economics scholars are divided on the desirability of the UBIT, they agree that the Section 501(c)(3) tax exemption provides covered not-for-profit entities with an advantage in competitiveness. For example, Professor Henry Hansmann argues that the UBIT should be retained because without it universities and other not-for-profit entities would have a strong incentive to invest directly in wholly owned businesses (rather than their securities) and avoid the income tax. He argues that not-for-profit entities are likely to be much less efficient 81 managers of these assets than their for-profit rivals and so there is a real resource cost to society from the exemption. In contrast, Professor Susan Rose Ackerman argues that the UBIT should 82 be eliminated because it causes charities to concentrate their investments in related activities in order to avoid the tax. She argues that the additional competition from not-for-profit entities is 83 unfair to competing for-profit entities because it decreases the profits of for-profit entities in these areas. 84 Thus, although Professors Ackerman and Hansmann disagree over the desirability of the UBIT, they both agree with the proposition that the Section 501(c)(3) tax exemption advantages tax-exempt entities relative to their taxable competitors. However, when looked at through the lens of competitiveness neutrality, the claim that underlies the existing literature on and debates surrounding the UBIT -that without the UBIT, not-for-profit firms would have a tax-driven competitiveness advantage over their for-profit rivals -is questionable. The discussion above of competitiveness neutrality suggests that we need to consider two scenarios depending upon whether the not-for-profit entity can finance the investment with outside financing or is forced to use inside financing.
Start with the possibility of outside financing. NYU cannot raise equity -whether to invest in Mueller, other for-profit businesses, or for any other purpose. The statutory provision that prohibits private benefits inuring to any individual prevents not-for-profit entities from Section 501(c)(3) (charitable and educational institutions are exempt from the income The benefit of a low cost of capital can be illustrated using the perpetuity. A for-profit 87 tt entity needs to earn $1000 x r (where r is the before-tax interest rate) to be able to offer $1000 for the asset. In contrast, a not-for-profit entity that finances the asset with tax-exempt debt te te needs to earn only $1000 x r (where r is the tax-exempt interest rate) to be able to offer $1000 for the asset.
The more debt the asset can support, the greater the advantage. There are, however, several reasons to believe that at the margin most charities cannot use tax-exempt debt to invest in businesses. First, charities cannot issue tax-exempt debt themselves, but must do so through a state agency. The requirement to work through a state 89 agency effectively excludes many smaller charities from using tax-exempt funding. It also adds 90 a level of oversight. Second, there are limits placed on the amount of tax-exempt debt that a charitable organization can issue. Those charities that are at their limit can only borrow 91 additional funds by issuing taxable debt. Third, charities are taxed on the income they earn from IRC Section 514.
92
IRC Section 148(a).
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Also, covered not-for-profit entities will not be able to price their products lower than 94 for-profit competitors because of their tax advantage since the income tax is zero at the margin.
That will occur if the candidate investment and benchmark asset are both taxed in line 95 with the income (or consumption) ideal. See discussion in Section III.B., supra.
Some of that benefit can be ameliorated by leasing. As described in Part V, a capital 96 lease can be used to separate the tax benefits that the assets generate, but which presumably have little or no value to the tax-exempt organization, from use of the assets in a venture.
The corporate finance literature has long recognized that because of agency costs, 97 bankruptcy costs, volatility and other reasons assets can support proportionately different 29 debt-financed property. Fourth, the anti-arbitrage rules take away the tax exemption on debt 92 that is used to acquire higher yielding investments. Thus, at the margin, it is likely that few tax-93 exempt entities will have a competitiveness advantage because taxes provide them with a lower cost of external debt financing than their for-profit competitors. 94 Accordingly, for most charities, the argument that tax-exempt investors have a competitiveness advantage when they compete with for-profit entities because their exemption from tax allows them to outbid tax-paying investors boils down to a straightforward application of the old money model. When a tax-exempt entity invests its own money, it makes its investment decisions by comparing rates of return across investments. Thus, a tax-exempt entity will pay less tax on income earned on the candidate investment than will a taxable competitor (an advantage), but it will also earn more on its alternative investments than will a taxable competitor (a disadvantage). These two effects will offset one another if the EMTRs for both the candidate investment and the benchmark asset are the same for all investors.
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In fact, if the candidate investment is undertaxed (low EMRT), as is likely the case with unincorporated businesses because of economically accelerated depreciation of tangible assets and the immediate expensing of many expenditures that produce long-term benefits (e.g., advertising), the taxable investors will actually have an advantage in bidding for the assets. Thus, there is likely to be little or no need for a UBIT on the grounds that tax-exemption confers a competitiveness advantage on tax-exempt entities. Indeed, in many instances, the advantage is in the opposite direction -for-profit entities have a tax-induced competitiveness advantage because they are more heavily taxed.
One of the few areas where tax-exempt entities enjoy an advantage (ignoring the UBIT) is with corporate investments that are financed with new equity. When competing against 97 amounts of debt.
The most obvious adjustment -to integrate the corporate and individual income taxes 98 so that individuals' equity investments in for-profit corporations are taxed no more heavily than other investments -would obviate the need for a UBIT in these circumstances by eliminating the disadvantage facing for-profit investors.
There is, thus, a timing difference because the personal level tax is only triggered when 99 a dividend or exchange occurs. The UBIT must take that timing difference into account in order to equalize the tax treatments between for-profit and not-for-profit entities.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
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corporations that need to raise new equity, tax-exempt entities enjoy an advantage because the new corporate equity is subject to two levels of tax, not just the one level that individual investors pay on their own account or when investing through a pass-through entity. As a result, the EMTR on new corporate equity investments likely exceeds the EMTR on the benchmark asset. The incremental tax that for-profit investors pay when they invest through corporations over what they pay on their other investments is likely to be, at most, only the tax on capital gains and dividends -15 percent. That incremental tax, by reducing the cash flow to the corporation's new equity investors, reduces the corporation's bid price relative to the not-for-profit entity's bid price. Thus, in these circumstances, there is a justification for collecting some tax from taxexempt entities in order to eliminate their tax-driven competitiveness advantage over competing for-profit entities.
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The UBIT, however, goes too far, and thereby gives taxable firms a competitiveness advantage over tax-exempt firms. The UBIT more than makes up for the incremental tax paid by the new equity investors in corporations in three ways. First, the incremental tax rate by equity investors through corporations is only 15 percent -the tax rate on dividends and redemptionswhich is substantially lower than the UBIT tax rate -35 percent. Second, there is an incremental tax liability only on to that portion of the investment financed by new equity. In contrast, the UBIT subjects the entire investment to the tax. Third, the UBIT is imposed when the income is earned by the covered entity, whereas the second level of tax is collected only when the investor receives cash, which is often later.
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B. Foreign direct investment/Cross-border transactions Perhaps more than any other area of the tax law, the tax treatment of cross-border transactions is informed by concerns with competitiveness. For example, the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act was aimed at eliminating a perceived tax advantage enjoyed by Japanese investors who purchased U.S. real estate at "fire sale" prices in the late 1970's. A 100 If tax rates vary across individual taxpayers within a country, then traditional tax 112 incentives will create clientele effects across investors from that country. These clientele effects will carry over to cross-border transactions.
In addition, if all investments can be financed using debt or other capital that produces 113 pass-through tax treatment, such as capital leases, then how the firms that make the investments are taxed is irrelevant. In those circumstances, the conduit pays no tax and so its tax treatment has no effect on the relative competitiveness of the various entities. However, because of agency costs and other concerns, it is not feasible to finance investments entirely with debt and debt substitutes. Thus, for conduits, how they are taxed matters.
For example, an investor in country B will earn $100 on a $1000 domestic investment 114 in the benchmark asset, pay $40 taxes and be left with $60. That same investor will also earn 10 percent, or $100 on a $1000 investment in the benchmark asset if it is located in country A. The 34 also willing to pay up to $1023.26 for the candidate investment. Thus, country B's tax incentives have not advantaged investors from one country over those from any other country. Therefore, as demonstrated above, when the competition for direct investment is between the investors, not conduits, then competitiveness neutrality is satisfied when all countries adopt territorial tax systems. In this case, each country is free to set its own tax rates on economic activity within its borders. Moreover, the tax system will satisfy competitiveness neutrality even when countries grant tax incentives in the traditional way of reducing taxable income.
b. Global Adoption of a Worldwide Tax System
Assume now that all countries adopt worldwide tax systems (with unlimited foreign tax credits). In that case, equilibrium implies that the before-tax rate of return on the benchmark asset will be equal across countries. Because the foreign tax credit is fully refundable, an investor from any country will value a series of before-tax cash flows the same regardless of where the cash flow arises. Moreover, for investments that have the same EMTR as the benchmark asset, the investor will value such investments as much as an equivalent amount of the benchmark asset. Since that equivalence holds for investors based in all countries, it therefore follows that all investors will value a given asset the same regardless of where they themselves are located. Thus, in a world where all countries employ worldwide tax systems (with fully refundable credits), relative tax rates do not affect competitiveness.
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Returning to the example of three countries -A, B and C -with tax rates of 25 percent, 40 percent and 50 percent. Assume now that all three countries adopt worldwide tax systems with fully refundable tax credits. In such a world, before-tax rates of return will be equal across countries. Assume the before-tax rate of return is 10 percent everywhere. Thus, an investor located in country B earns 6 percent after tax on investments in the benchmark asset. An investor will pay $25 to country A, report $100 income to country B, be assessed a tax liability of $40, receive a foreign tax credit of $25, and so will be left owing $15 to B's tax authorities. Thus, an investor from country B will earn 10 percent on the benchmark asset located in country A, pay total tax at a rate of 40 percent and so be left with an after-tax return of 6 percent. If that same investor invests $1000 in the benchmark asset when it is located in country C, then the one year return of $100 attracts $50 of tax. The investor reports $100 income to country B and is assessed a tax liability of $40. Having paid $50, the investor will receive a refund of $10. Thus, again, the investor located in country B will earn 10 percent on the benchmark asset in country C, pay total tax at a rate of 40 percent, and be left with an after-tax return of 6 percent. The same logic applies to investors based in countries A and C, except that their after-tax rates of return are different -7.5 percent and 5 percent.
The investor pays $40 in taxes to country B and receives a $15 refund from country A.
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The investor pays $40 in taxes to country B and pays $10 in taxes to country C. 116 35 investor based in country A earns 7.5 percent after tax, whereas an investor based in country C earns 5 percent.
Consider a candidate one-period direct investment in country B that will return $1100 in one year. If that investment is purchased for $1000 by an investor located in country B, the investor will receive an after-tax return of $1060 (because the $100 income attracts $40 tax). Such an investment is in fact worth $1000 to the investor because the benchmark asset also yields an after-tax return to that investor of 6 percent. An investor from country A who purchased the same investment for $1000 would also report $100 income, but such an investor would pay only $25 in tax, and thus be left with $1075. Nonetheless, the investment is worth 115 no more to an investor from country A because such an investor earns 7.5 percent after-tax on the benchmark asset. For such an investor, $1000 in the bank will grow to $1075, and thus the candidate investment is worth $1000 -exactly what it was worth to the investor based in country B. For an investor based in country C, the investment, if purchased for $1000, will return $1050 after paying taxes. However, because such an investor uses an after-tax discount rate of 5 116 percent, the investment is again worth $1000. Therefore, since all investors will value the investment the same, no one has a tax-driven competitiveness advantage, even though they are located in different countries with different tax rates.
The discussion above assumed that the candidate investment was taxed the same as the benchmark asset. What if that is not the case?
Assume that country B adopts a tax incentive that has the effect of reducing the tax rate on the investment from 40 percent to 20 percent. In that case, investors from countries A and C still will not be willing to pay any more than $1000 to make the investment. Specifically, they will not be willing to pay as much as investors from country B -$1023.26 -to make the The maximum price that an investor from country B is willing to pay to make the 117 investment is the same as with universal adoption of a territorial system because for such an investor the transaction is purely domestic and because the before-tax rate of return is assumed unchanged.
If the asset can be leased, then the value is the same to investors from all three 118 countries -$1023.26.
In a related paper, I intend to describe this problem more fully, emphasizing how a 119 worldwide tax system exposes the United States to the possibility of seeing its multinational competitors disadvantaged by foreign countries' tax incentives, and then show how to reform the FTC to eliminate the disadvantage. The key is to have the FTC credit implicit as well as explicit taxes. Such a credit would be similar in result to, but different in justification from, tax sparring, which the United States rejects. 36 investment. Start with investors in country A. If they purchased the asset for $1023.26, they 117 would report $77.74 income and pay $15.35 tax to country B. Such an investor would report a tax liability to country A of $19.19, receive a tax credit of $15.35, and so owe an additional $3.84. That will leave the investor with $1080.81 after paying taxes. In order to have $1080.81 in one year after paying taxes, the country A investor has to deposit $1005.40 in the bank. That is, then, the most an investor from country A will bid to make the investment. Thus, taxes will discourage investors from country A from making the investment and therefore will place them at a tax-induced competitiveness disadvantage relative to investors from country B.
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Similarly, an investor in country C would report $77.74 in income if the investment was acquired for $1023.26, pay $15.35 tax to country B, report a tax liability to country C of $38.87, receive a tax credit of $15.35, and so would owe an additional $23.52 in tax to country C. Thus, the investor will be left with $1061.13 after paying taxes. To have the same amount in one year after paying taxes, the investor must deposit $1010.60. Thus, an investor from country C will also be competitively disadvantaged relative to investors from country B.
The reason why investors from countries A and C are disadvantaged relative to investors from country B is because the FTC does not credit implicit taxes, only explicit taxes. Accordingly, a foreign investor from a country with a worldwide tax system is at a disadvantage when competing for a tax-advantaged investment. Such an investor will pay both implicit and explicit taxes, whereas a domestic investor will pay only implicit taxes. In the two preceding subsections, I looked at competitiveness when countries coordinated their decision whether to adopt a territorial or worldwide tax system. Specifically, in Section VI.B.1.a., all countries were assumed to use a territorial tax system; and in Section VI.B.1.b., all This is true even for candidate investments with the same EMTR as the benchmark.
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The same argument applies with debt financing.
121
See discussion in Part V, supra. 122 37 countries were assumed to use a worldwide tax system. What happens if, as in the world today, some countries use a territorial tax system and other countries use a worldwide tax system? If countries do not harmonize their choice of a territorial or worldwide tax regime, then there is no choice that a country can make that will guarantee competitive neutrality with respect to all competitors for candidate investments in all possible different locations. Moreover, 120 because competitiveness depends on relative advantage, if an investor enjoys a tax-induced competitiveness advantage somewhere relative to another investor, then that same investor will be at a disadvantage elsewhere relative to that same investor.
Direct Investments by Conduits: The (Conduit or New Money) Model
The discussion, so far, has looked at competition between investors. The results then apply to direct investments by individual investors and to direct investments by individual investors through wholly transparent pass-through entities. The result will also apply to corporations and other entities that treat retained cash as their own. This section expands that discussion to look at competition across conduits. Thus, this section will draw upon the conduit (or new money) model.
The investor (or old money) model ignores the possibility and, in many circumstances, the need to raise funds in order to invest. When competitors need to raise capital, competitiveness increases as the tax burden on such funds decreases. In these circumstances, a competitor with a low EMTR on new capital is likely to have an advantage in competitiveness over competitors with a higher EMTR.
Start easily. If firms do not have to own any of the assets used in the operation of a business, but can lease all of the assets they need, then as long as the tax rules respect the form of these transactions, domestic tax policies, including the decision whether to adopt territorial or worldwide taxation and the setting of tax rates, will probably not affect the competitiveness of domestic firms. In effect, if multinational corporations can obtain all of their capital through leases and other financial arrangements that shift taxable income outside of the firms, they will only be taxed on their economic profits. Because such profits are above and beyond an raise the money to invest; the investor (or old money) model applies when competitors invest their own money. When competitors raise the money that they invest, competitiveness neutrality requires that the tax cost of new investment funds are equal. When competitors invest their own money, it is not necessary that tax burdens (rates) be equal across investors. Instead, only the dollar value of tax incentives and disincentives must be equal across competitors.
The failure to recognize the existence of these two models and to understand the relationship between them has produced misguided policies and has diverted scholarly attention in important areas of the tax law, including the taxation of not-for-profit entities and the taxation of cross-border transactions. For example, the UBIT is based on the mistaken belief that not-forprofit entities have a tax-induced competitiveness advantage over for-profit entities because of the former's exemption from tax. Such a belief can be traced to the mistaken application of the conduit (or new money) model instead of the investor (or old money) model to not-for-profit entities. The investor model generally applies to not-for-profit entities because they are prohibited from raising equity and are restricted on their ability to raise and use debt finance. Similarly, Professor Hines and Desai's concept of capital ownership neutrality (CON) and their argument that universal adoption of either a territorial or a worldwide tax system with any rate structure will satisfy CON also confuses the two models, but in the opposite direction. Their argument is derived solely from the investor model without considering the conduit model. Thus, in a world, such as ours, with relatively open capital markets, their analysis ignores, for example, the competition between multinational corporations based in different countries to raise funds to invest.
A better understanding of the relationship between taxes and competitiveness will do more than allow academics to recognize past policy mistakes. It can also help policymakers to develop new policies. By recognizing that there are two different and distinct models of how taxes impact competitiveness, by familiarizing themselves with the key differences between the models, and by understanding when each one is appropriate, policymakers should be able to produce better and more balanced tax policies in these and other important areas of the tax law.
Finally, much scholarly work remains to be done. The two most obvious gaps to me are the need for more empirical work on how taxes affect competitiveness and the systematic working out the relationships between existing tax doctrines, popular transactional structures, and competitiveness.
